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The financial crisis of 2008 highlights the importance of detecting crowded trades due to the risks
they pose to the stability of the financial system and to the global economy. However, there is a perception
that crowded trades are difficult to identify. To date, no single measure to capture the crowdedness
of a trade or a trading style has developed.   We propose a methodology to measure crowded trades
and apply it to professional currency managers. Our results suggest that carry became a crowded trading
strategy towards the end of Q1 2008, shortly before a massive liquidation of carry trades. The timing
suggests a possible adverse relationship between our measure of style crowdedness and the future
performance of the trading style. Crowdedness in the trend following and value strategies confirm
this hypothesis.
We apply our approach to currencies but the methodology is general and could be used to measure
the popularity or crowdedness of any trade with an identifiable time series return. Our methodology
may offer useful insights regarding the popularity of certain trades – in currencies, gold, or other assets
– among hedge funds. Further research in this area might be very relevant for investors, managers
and regulators.
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Over the last twenty years, institutional investors have greatly increased their allocations 
to alternative investments like hedge funds, and away from traditional assets like equities 
and bonds. For example, a survey conducted by the National Association of College and 
University Business Officers (2008) found that US university endowments larger than $1 
billion allocated more than 20% of their assets to hedge funds. This strategy was partly 
the result of a conventional belief that hedge funds could pursue more diverse strategies, 
that diversification is the key for successful investing and that the returns on alternative 
assets will have little or no correlation with returns on traditional investments.  
 
However, the transfer of substantial assets under management to hedge fund harbored 
considerable risks for investors and the broader financial system. Addressing the 
Economic Club of New York in 2004, Timothy Geithner, then President of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York, put the matter quite bluntly. “While there may well be more 
diversity in the types of strategies hedge funds follow, there is also considerable 
clustering, which raises the prospect of larger moves in some markets if conditions lead 
to a general withdrawal from these ‘crowded’ trades.”
1 
 
                                                           
1 Remarks by President Timothy F. Geithner before the Economic Club of New York, May 27, 2004.   2
In many ways, Geithner’s conjecture about returns in crowed trades was realized during 
the global financial crisis. In 2008 many investors discovered that they were less 
diversified than planned. The HFRI Fund Weighted Composite Index (an equally-
weighted composite of over 2,000 hedge funds) declined 19.04% in 2008 offering little 
joy to battered equity investors. The negative returns of many market neutral funds in a 
period of declining equity markets suggests that what investors had perceived to be 
uncorrelated alpha turned out to be equity beta. Allocations to commodities (another 
asset class presumed to provide diversification) were costly too, with crude oil crashing 
from a $146.50 high in July 2008 to a $42.79 low in December 2008. The experience of 
2008 confirmed what had been previously documented in academic research a decade 
earlier (see Chow, et al. 1999), i.e. in turbulent markets, asset returns generally become 
more volatile and more highly correlated. Thus, diversification tends to fail exactly when 
it is most needed, i.e. in falling markets.  
 
What forces underlie this increase in correlation? Deleveraging and forced selling are 
plausible causes. In turbulent times, volatility swells and investment managers are forced 
to reduce the size of their exposures to avoid breaching tracking-error limits. At the same 
time, investors become more risk averse and withdraw money from risky assets. 
Outflows trigger additional selling.  Prime brokers raise margin requirements for hedge 
funds, which compounds the problem as managers have to cut positions further.
2 As a 
                                                           
2 Assuming a margin requirement of 15%, an investor with $15 equity could support a position of up to 
$100 (or 15/15%). An increase of the margin requirement to 25% would mean that he could support a 
position of only $60 (or 15/25%), i.e. he would be forced to reduce his positions by 40%.    3
result, returns in many asset classes drop concurrently, and the returns on many 
strategies move as if they reflected the same trade.
3  
 
Exhibit 1 (Panel A) shows the correlations between the weekly returns on the S&P 500 
index, crude oil and spot AUD/JPY (a proxy for the carry trade) in the second half of 
2008. The results show that these presumably “independent assets” exhibited very high 
correlation, with correlation between the S&P 500 index and AUD/JPY strikingly high 
at 84%. The correlation between S&P 500 index and crude oil was 56% in this period, 
which is remarkably higher than the long term correlation of 2% (see Panel B). 
 
In turbulent periods, positioning and being aware of crowded trades becomes crucial as 
traders may try to exit trades at the same time and in the same direction. The 
phenomenon of large numbers of traders exiting similar trades at the same time creates 
liquidity problems as everyone is rushing to exit a “burning house.” However, in order to 
leave a “burning house,” it is not enough to reach the exit, but rather to persuade 
someone from the outside to take your place, i.e. to take the other side of the trade. 
Therefore, it is hardly a surprise that “positioning” and the concentration, or popularity, 
or the crowded nature of certain trades and trading styles are highly discussed topics 
among investment managers.
4 Changes in investor positioning are used often to justify 
                                                           
3 Pedersen (2009) compares the risk of being in a crowded trade when a shock occurs to being in a 
crowded theater assuming someone shouts “fire.” The real risk of being injured by the fire is exacerbated 
by the endogenous risk of being trampled by other theater patrons. Pedersen develops a stylized model in 
which “liquidity spirals” amplify and spread the initial shock, so that selling begets more selling, tighter 
risk management, withdrawals of capital, and so on.  
4 At the Quant Invest 2009 conference in Paris, Robert Litterman of Goldman Sachs is reported to have 
said that computer-driven hedge funds needed to identify new areas to exploit, as some areas had become   4
price moves which can not be explained by fundamentals. “The market sold off because 
of profit taking” is an often used argument to justify price moves despite the lack of 
fundamental news.
5 Recent academic studies (Evans and Lyons, 2002) also find a strong 
correlation between order flow in the foreign exchange market and subsequent currency 
rate changes. Because currencies have proved to move without strong connection to 
fundamentals, positioning is often at the center of debate among currency professionals.
6  
 
To illustrate the importance of positioning, as a part of their periodic foreign exchange 
research commentaries some banks have introduced Commodities Futures Trading 
Commission data on market positioning in currency futures.
7 These analyses focus on 
the positioning of the non-commercial or speculative accounts. Custodians also are able 
to take advantage of their proprietary equity flow data in order to gauge positioning. For 
example, State Street Bank and Trust (SSBT) is said to make use of their proprietary 
flow data to gauge positioning across different currencies.
8 To date, however, no single 
measure to capture the crowdedness of a trade or trading style has developed. 
 
In this paper, we develop a new approach to detect positioning and identifying crowded 
trades. We apply our approach to currencies but the methodology is general and could be 
used to measure the popularity or crowdedness of any trade with an identifiable time 
                                                                                                                                                                           
so overcrowded that they are no longer profitable. “Quant Hedgies Must Fish In Fresh Waters – 
Goldman,” Reuters, December 1, 2009. 
5 Profit taking implies in this case that the market was long. 
6 There is a widespread consensus in academic literature that macroeconomic variables offer little help in 
exchange rate forecasting. In a seminal paper, Meese and Rogoff (1983) show that random walk forecasts 
outperform economic models of exchange rates. This is called the foreign exchange disconnect puzzle. 
Rogoff and Stavrakeva (2008) discuss the recent evidence.  
7 See Deutsche Bank, Global Markets Research “DB FX Positioning Indices”, May 18, 2009.   5
series return. Currencies may become more highly correlated when investors pursue 
similar trading strategies. For example, there is little fundamental reason to expect high 
correlation between currency returns on the GBP/CHF cross and the NZD/JPY cross. 
However, a carry trader, who establishes a long position in high yielding currencies by 
taking a short position in a low yielding currencies, could very likely have been long the 
two crosses (long GBP vs. CHF and long NZD vs. JPY) over much of the last twenty 
years, as interest rates in New Zealand and the United Kingdom were generally higher 
than interest rates in Japan and Switzerland, respectively.
9 Increasing popularity of the 
carry trade could help account for the greater correlation of these two crosses in recent 
years (see Exhibit 2). Indeed, the rolling annual correlation of the GBP/CHF and 
NZD/JPY cross rates rose above 0.50 in the late 1990s, and then fell sharply after the 
liquidation of the Yen carry trade between June 1998 and December 1999.
10  T h e  
correlation rose again in 2007 and peaked in the fourth quarter of 2008, a period which 
once again experienced massive liquidation of carry trades.  
 
Analyzed in this way, currency traders appear more focused on exposure to a particular 
risk factor or trading strategy and less so on exposure to particular currencies. A large 
short JPY exposure might be offset by long CHF exposure as both currencies rallied 
during the recent carry trade liquidation. And a seemingly small short JPY exposure 
becomes more risky when combined with exposures to other carry trade proxies.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
8 See Froot and Ramadorai (2005, 2008) for analyses that rely on the SSBT equity flow data.  
9 See Froot and Thaler (1990) for a survey of the carry trade.  
10 The USD/JPY spot rate fell from levels above 145 to almost 100 during this time period.    6
Previous research (see Pojarliev and Levich (PL), 2008a) has shown that four factors (or 
styles), which represents the return on several well-known currency trading strategies 
and the foreign exchange volatility explain a significant part of the variability of the 
returns of professional currency managers. Thus, exposures to these factors might be a 
useful way to gauge the popularity or crowdedness of a trading strategy. We define style 
crowdedness as the percentage of the funds with significant positive exposure to a given 
style less the percentage of the funds with significant negative exposure to the same style 
(contrarians).
11 To estimate crowdedness, we rely on data for 80 currency managers for 
three years between April 2005 and March 2008. We estimate style betas using the four 
factor model proposed in PL (2008a). We use higher frequency, weekly return data to 
obtain efficient parameters estimates for rolling 26-week periods.  
 
Our initial results are quite promising and consistent with a view that crowded trades 
harbour potential risk once a change in fundamentals or sentiment induces liquidation of 
positions. Our analysis shows that carry became a crowded strategy towards the end of 
our sample period (March 2008), i.e. just a few months before the crash in 
October/November 2008. Trend and value trading strategies exhibit similar patterns. 
Investors “gave up” on trend at the end of our sample period and the trend strategy 
experienced big gains a few months later. Value became a popular contrarian strategy (a 
high proportion of the funds exhibited significant negative value exposure) just a few 
                                                           
11 Alternatively, each manager could be weighted by their assets under management (AUM). In a related 
paper, Jylhä and Suominen (2009) find that AUM at hedge funds are significantly related to 
contemporaneous and expedited future returns from a risk-adjusted carry trade. Unfortunately, we do not 
have data on AUM for the managers in our sample to experiment with this alternative measure.    7
months before performing exceptionally well. Our results suggest that style crowdedness 
may impact the future performance of its respective style.  
 
In the next section of the paper, we lay out our methodology for estimating crowdedness. 
In section 3, we report our estimates of crowdedness, present some empirical evidence 
on its determinants and discuss the relationship of current crowdedness to future 
performance. Conclusions and implications of our findings are in the final section.  
   8
2. Data Description and Definition of Crowdedness 
To measure exposure to styles, we follow the approach used in PL (2008a) and use a 
standard factor model of the form: 
 
∑ + + =




R is the excess return generated by the currency manager, defined as the total 
return (
*
t R ) less the periodic risk-free rate ( t F R , ) 
 
α is a measure of active manager skill, 
 
F is a beta factor, that requires a systematic risk premium in the market, 
 
β is a coefficient or factor loading that measures the sensitivity of the manager’s 
returns to the factor, and  
 
ε is a random error term. 
 
To implement this approach, we require data on currency manager returns and factors 
that proxy for types of trading strategies and exposures that currency managers would be 
likely to utilize.  
 
We make use of the same data base as used in Pojarliev and Levich (2008b), i.e. daily 
return data for currency managers listed on the Deutsche Bank FXSelect trading 
platform.
12 We obtain daily data for 80 funds between April 2005 and March 2008. Only 
                                                           
12 Launched in March 2005, FXSelect is an open platform, which allows clients of Deutsche Bank to 
allocate their funds to different currency managers. Any currency manager can apply for registration in the 
platform and be accepted if he satisfies the following criteria: a) Managers must be able to provide a daily 
track record for at least the last 18 months verified by a third party, b) They cannot have had more than a 
20% performance drawdown over the last 12 months, c) Assets under management must be at least 15 
million USD, and d) Satisfactory criminal and regulatory searches on key individuals. We are grateful to 
Neville Bulgin and Rashid Hoosenally from Deutsche Bank for supplying the data. More information   9
15 of these funds have a complete 3-year track record. To correct for accounting errors 
and eliminate data outliers, we transform the daily returns into weekly returns by using 
Wednesday observations.
13 The data base is especially useful as it provides us with high 
frequency returns and allows for the correction of backfill and survivorship bias.
14  
 
Data for Risk Factors  
As risk factors we make use of the same proxies as in PL (2008b).  
Carry Factor 
We use the Deutsche Bank G10 Harvest Index as the proxy for the returns of a carry 
strategy. This index reflects the return of being long the 3 high-yielding currencies 
against being short the 3 low-yielding currencies within the G10 currency universe. The 
index is rebalanced quarterly. Every quarter the currencies are re-ranked according to 




As a proxy for the trend-following factor, we use the AFX Currency Management 
Index.
15 The AFX Index is based on trading in seven currency pairs weighted by their 
                                                                                                                                                                           
about FXSelect can be find in the brochure “FXSelect: An Asset Allocation Solution,” Deutsche Bank, 
Global Markets Foreign Exchange, 2006.   
13 We decided to use Wednesday as fewer bank holidays fall on Wednesday. Managers were based in 
different locations (US, UK, Australia, Switzerland, Monaco, Spain, Sweden, Germany, Ireland and 
Canada).   
14 For more information see Pojarliev and Levich (2008b). 
15 Monthly data for this index are available at the AFX web site (http://www.ljmu.ac.uk/LBS/95327.htm). 
We are grateful to Jason Laws from the Liverpool John Moore University for providing daily data. We 
transformed the daily returns into weekly returns by using the Wednesday observations.   10
volume of turnover in the spot market, with returns for each pair based on an equally-




We use the Deutsche Bank FX PPP Index as the proxy for the returns of a value strategy. 
To gauge relative value, Deutsche Bank prepares a ranking based on the average daily 
spot rate over the last three months divided by the PPP exchange rate as published 
annually by the OECD. The FX PPP index reflects the return of being long the 3 
currencies with the highest rank (undervalued currencies) against being short the 3 
currencies with the lowest rank (overvalued currencies) within G10 currency universe. 
The Bloomberg code for this factor is DBPPPUSF Index. 
 
Currency Volatility Factor 
We use the Deutsche Bank Currency Volatility Index as the proxy for foreign exchange 
volatility.  This index is calculated as the weighted average of 3-month implied volatility 
for nine major currency pairs (as provided by the British Bankers Association) with 
weights based on trading volume in the BIS surveys.
17 The Bloomberg code for this 
factor is CVIX Index. We use the first difference for this factor in equation (1) as it is 
not a trading strategy. In the case of the previous three factors, we use returns.  
 
                                                           
16 The seven currency pairs are EUR-USD, USD-JPY, USD-CHF, GBP-USD, EUR-JPY, EUR-GBP, and 
EUR-CHF. 
17 The nine currency pairs are EUR-USD, USD-JPY, USD-CHF, USD-CAD, AUD-USD, GBP-USD, 
EUR-JPY, EUR-GBP, and EUR-CHF.   11
Definition of Crowdedness  
We define the crowdedness of style F at time t (CF,t) as the percentage of the funds with 
significant positive exposure to style F less the percentage of the funds with significant 
negative exposure to the same style (contrarians). 
 
t F t F t F b a C , , , − =       ( 2 )  
where 
 
aF,t  is the percentage of funds with significant positive exposure to risk factor F 
over the period t-25  through  t, i.e. we use rolling windows of 26 weeks to 
estimate the exposures to the risk factors with equation (1).  
 
bF,t  is the percentage of funds with significant negative exposure to risk factor F 
over the period t-25 through t-25, i.e. we use rolling windows of 26 weeks to 
estimate the exposures to the risk factors with equation (1). 
 
For both positive and negative exposures, we use a standard 95% confidence 
level and t-value with absolute value greater than or equal to 2.0 to indentify 
significant exposure.   12
3. Empirical Results  
a. Time Variation in Crowdedness  
To determine which funds have significant exposure to each trading strategy, we 
estimate equation (1) using a rolling sample of 26 weekly observations over the 3-year 
(156 week) sample period, April 6, 2005 – March 26, 2008. Thus, we are able to 
estimate crowdedness on 131 dates commencing September 28, 2005 running through 
March 26, 2008. Funds on the platform for less than 26 weeks are excluded from our 
analysis. The number of funds used to estimate crowdedness varies from week to week 
as new funds join the platform and some funds exit the platform. Exhibit 3 plots the 
number of funds used to estimate crowdedness. The number of funds is the lowest (22) 
at the beginning of the sample. It then rises steadily toward 60 in late 2006 as the 
number of funds joining the platform exceeds the number of funds leaving the platform 
and remains stable around 55 for the remainder of the sample. 
  
To illustrate the methodology, Exhibit 4 plots the estimated t-statistics for alpha and the 
betas for fund #6 (indicating fund #6 in the data base). This fund has a full track record 
of 3 years (156 weeks), so we obtain t-statistics for 131 weeks, using a rolling window 
of 26 weeks. Exhibit 4 shows that over the entire sample period, fund #6 never achieved 
a significant alpha. Fund #6 generally had positive exposure to carry and trend and 
negative exposure to value and volatility. However, these exposures were not 
consistently significant throughout the entire sample period, i.e. the t-statistics of the   13
factor loadings were not constantly above 2 (or below -2).
18 For example, the exposure 
to value was most of the time not significant, but there were periods (at the beginning of 
2006 and towards the middle of 2007) when this manager exhibited strong contrarian 
value positioning, i.e. the t-statistics of the value factor were between -2 and -3.  Thus, 
manager #6 appears to have discretionary trading authority, tracking Value at some 
times and not at others, and taking other positions not significantly related to the Carry 
and Trend factors. 
 
Crowdedness 
Using t-values from equation (1), we estimate crowdedness using equation (2) for three 
of the four factors, i.e. carry, value and trend. As the fourth risk factor does not represent 
return on a trading strategy, but simply the first difference of the implied foreign 
exchange volatility, we do not estimate crowdedness for volatility.  
 
Carry Crowdedness 
Exhibit 5 plots our measure for carry crowdedness between September 28, 2005 and 
March 26, 2008. We also plot acarry,t and bcarry,t  representing the percentage of the funds 
with significant positive exposure to carry and the percentage of the funds with 
significant negative exposure to carry (the contrarians). We also graph the performance 
of the carry strategy until the end of 2008.  
 
                                                           
18 We are referring here to the results of the rolling regressions. PL 2008b show that manager #6 exhibits 
significant positive exposure to carry and trend and no significant exposure to value and volatility over the 
entire 3 year time period.    14
Exhibit 5 suggests an interesting story. At the beginning of our sample, carry 
crowdedness was minimal (around 5%) as only about 10% of the funds in our analysis 
were significantly exposed to carry and the “contrarians” were about 5%. As carry 
started to exhibit very strong performance between the middle of 2006 and the middle of 
2007, the number of both carry managers and contrarians increased. The first group was 
chasing the good performance of the carry strategy; the second group was betting that 
carry is overdone. As the first group was only slightly larger than the second, carry-
crowdedness increased steadily to about 15%. In the summer 2007, the contrarians 
started to “die-out” as the performance of the carry strategy accelerated.
19 As a result 
carry crowdedness reached a peak at 31% at the end of March 2008 as the contrarians 
either gave up or were forced out of the market. Interestingly, the carry strategy exhibits 
a substantial decline just a few months later. While the popular press attributes the 
liquidation of the carry trade to the credit crunch and the decline of the equity markets, a 
possible reason behind the rapid liquidation of carry trades might be that this strategy 
had become crowded. This result is consistent with the “liquidity spiral” story suggested 
by Pedersen (2009) and the shrinking hedge fund asset base discussed in Jylhä and 
Suominen (2009).  
 
Trend Crowdedness 
Exhibit 6 plots our measure for trend-crowdedness. In contrast to the carry-crowdedness, 
trend was a relative crowded strategy at the beginning of our sample period. The 
                                                           
19 PL (2008b) found out that managers who did not survive had as a group a significantly negative 
exposure to carry between April 2005 and March 2008. Ironically, although the liquidation of the carry   15
percentage of the funds which had significant positive trend exposure was between 25% 
and 35%, with only a very small percentage of the funds being “contrarians”. As most of 
the currency research in the 1990s (see for example Levich and Thomas, 1993) 
advocated trend-following strategies, this is not a surprise. However, as trend failed to 
deliver returns, crowdedness declined to only 4% at the end of our sample. This change 
did not result from a rise in the numbers of contrarians, but rather that trend-followers 
appeared to be “giving up.” Ironically, the trend strategy did deliver excellent 
performance about six months later in the fall 2008.  
 
Value Crowdedness 
Exhibit 7 plots our measure for value-crowdedness. The pattern is different, but the main 
story is similar. The percentage of the funds which exhibited positive significant 
exposure to value was relatively small and constant around 10%. On the other hand, the 
percentage of the contrarians (funds with significant negative value exposure) was rising 
steadily during the investigated time horizon, and peaked at 32% towards the end of the 
period. Thus the contrarian value trade became progressively more crowded reaching 
about 25% near the end of our sample. A few months later in the summer 2008, the 
financial crisis intensified and undervalued currencies rose, causing substantial losses to 
contrarian value traders, who had crowded into this position.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
trade might have hurt carry managers, the strong performance of the carry strategy until the credit crunch 
was devastating for managers betting on liquidation of carry trades.    16
b. Determinants of Crowdedness  
 
As we can see from Exhibits 5, 6 and 7, our measure of crowdedness can vary 
considerably. For example, Carry Crowdedness rose from a low of -7% as of December 
28, 2005 to a high of 31% as of March 26, 2008. Trend crowdedness ranged between 4% 
and 34%. And Value crowdedness varied between about +12% early in the sample to 
about -27% toward the end.  
 
In this section we consider the question of what drives crowdedness. There are two 
channels through which a strategy becomes popular or crowded – (1) Through existing 
managers moving into or out of a strategy, and (2) as managers leave or join the DB 
platform which determines the size of our data sample. Exhibit 8 summarizes the 
composition of our universe of managers at the low and at the high in crowdedness for 
each style.   
 
Carry Crowdedness was at its low on December 28, 2005. At that point, 41 funds were 
active on the platform (13 of these funds (31%) did not survive until the end of our time 
horizon). Of the 41 funds, 2 had significant carry exposure, 5 were betting against carry 
and 34 had no significant carry exposure. Carry Crowdedness peaked at the end of our 
sample period, i.e. on March 26, 2008. At that point, 54 funds were active on the 
platform (with a track record of at least 26 weeks). From these 54 funds, 28 were active 
as of December 28, 2005 and 26 were new funds.  
   17
Of the new funds, 11 (or 42%) had significant carry exposure. Furthermore, a significant 
proportion from the existing funds with no carry exposure (10 funds or 24%) converted 
to having positive carry exposure.  Thus, only one of the carry managers at the peak of 
Carry Crowdedness was a carry manager when Carry Crowdedness was at its low. The 
increase in the Carry Crowdedness seems to have been driven by 1) many new funds 
with positive carry exposure joining the platform, and 2) a large number of the existing 
funds with no carry exposure, adopting a carry style.   
 
Trend Crowdedness was at its peak on December 6, 2006. At that point, 59 funds were 
active on the platform (18 of these funds (30%) did not survive until the end of our time 
horizon). Of these 59 funds, 21 had significant trend exposure, 1 was betting against 
trend and 37 had no significant trend exposure. Trend Crowdedness was at its low at the 
end of our time horizon, i.e. on March 26, 2008. At that point, 54 funds were active on 
the platform (with a track record of at least 26 weeks). Of these 54 funds, 41 were active 
as of December 28, 2005 and 13 were new funds. Of the new funds, 11 (or 84%) had no 
significant trend exposure. Furthermore, of the 21 funds with positive trend exposure, 14 
funds (or 66%) exited the trend style, i.e. had no exposure to trend as of the end of the 
time horizon. From the 22 managers with trend following exposure at the time of the 
peak in Trend Crowdedness, only 2 managers exhibited trend exposure at the time of the 
low in the Trend Crowdedness. Thus, the decline in the Trend Crowdedness seems to be 
driven by 1) new funds joining the platform with no trend exposure, and 2) a large 
number of the initial trend-followers “giving up” on trend.   
   18
Value Crowdedness was at its peak on January 18, 2006. At that point, 41 funds were 
active on the platform and 12 of these funds (or 29%) did not survive until the end of our 
time horizon. Of these 41 funds, 6 had significant value exposure, 1 was betting against 
value and 34 had no significant value exposure. From the 6 funds with positive value 
exposure, 4 funds left the value style and 2 funds exited the platform. None of the value 
funds as of January 18, 2006 remained positively exposed to value as of March 12, 2008.  
Value Crowdedness was at its low towards the end of our time horizon, i.e. on March 12, 
2008. At that point, 56 funds were active on the platform (with a track record of at least 
26 weeks). From these 56 funds, 29 were active as of December 28, 2005 and 27 were 
new funds. Of the new funds, eight (29%) had significant negative value exposure 
(contrarian).  The decline in value crowdedness seems to be driven by a) new funds 
joining the platform betting against value, and b) a large number of the existing funds 
(10 funds) converting to a value contrarian strategy.   
 
As we can see from Exhibit 8, the change in crowdedness across the different styles is 
driven by the change in styles of the existing managers, but also in the different styles 
characteristics of the new joiner. What may be behind these shifts?  It is reasonable to 
assume that there should be a link between speculative positions in some strategy and 
the expected returns on that strategy. If expected returns go up, then optimal portfolio 
allocation tilts toward higher weights on that strategy and we expect to find that more 
fund managers have significant betas versus that strategy. Expected returns on a strategy 
could be modelled as a function of past returns on that strategy. In other words, we 
expect to see herding in the sense that positive returns on a strategy attracts newcomers,   19
and negative returns on a strategy encourage managers to abandon a strategy. As we 
measure crowdedness over 26 weeks, we cumulate the performance of the different 
strategies also over 26 weeks. Our methodology (of confirming whether or not a 
manager is following some strategy) relies on estimating betas, and needs a number of 
weeks before we can determine whether or not a manager has shifted his allocations in 
response to higher expected returns in any strategy. So there is a lag of 26 weeks 
between when returns on a strategy first appear and when we (the researcher) can 
identify a statistically significant relationship, or style beta. Therefore, we have to lag the 
cumulative past performance of the strategies by 26 weeks to explore the linkage with 
our measure of crowdedness.  
 
Exhibit 9 summarizes the correlations between our measure of crowdedness and the 
lagged performance of the trading strategies. Panel A contains results over the whole 
sample period. Panels B and C show results for the first and second halves of the sample. 
Panel A suggests some herding of the carry strategy: good past performance attracts 
newcomers. The opposite appears to be true for Value Crowdedness: strong past 
performance does not attract more managers. This is understandable. In the case of the 
value strategy, returns are generated from long (short) positions in under- (over-) valued 
currencies that become more fairly valued. Strong past performance in value presages 
lower expected future return from this strategy. In the case of the trend style, the 
correlation between past performance and crowdedness is remarkably close to zero. A 
possible reason for that might be that trend performed close to flat during these time   20
periods. As performance was neither encouraging nor discouraging it played little role in 
attracting new managers.  
It is interesting that the correlation of the carry style with crowdedness is slightly 
negative in the second sub-sample (see Panel C). Carry performed especially badly 
towards the end of this time period and managers might have expected a rebound.   
 
The link between expected return of a strategy and the popularity (crowdedness) of this 
strategy is weaker than we have expected. Several factors may account for this. First, not 
all managers have discretionary authority to allocate toward a given currency strategy, 
even when it appears to be profitable. For example, a fund that specializes in trend 
following, and has stated so in an investment mandate, cannot shift and take positions in 
carry trades even when they appear likely to generate profits. Only discretionary 
managers can shift their trading style in response to a new market environment. So only 
a small number of managers in the sample have the ability to shift. We should not expect 
that 100% of all the managers in any sample will follow carry (for example) when carry 
is profitable, because some of those managers are trend followers or value managers, by 
design or choice. Second, managers might be constrained in joining the platform; a fund 
needs 18 months of track record to list on DB FX Select. Therefore, even if a new carry 
manager might be keen to join the platform (as he expects future carry returns to be 
high), he would have to wait for the appropriate track record before to join. Finally, the   21
past return of a strategy might not be the best proxy of what managers think regarding 
future return of a strategy.
20  
 
c. Current Crowdedness and Future Performance  
 
Our measures of crowdedness offer an interesting interpretation of events in currency 
markets over the financial crisis period. In the last quarter of 2008, the less popular and 
less crowded strategy worked best for carry and value plays. The data show that a higher 
than usual percentage of the funds were significantly exposed to carry, and these funds 
suffered during the market turbulence in the last quarter of 2008 when carry collapsed. 
Similarly, a high percentage of the funds were significantly betting against value, but 
value delivered strong performance, causing substantial losses for the contrarians who 
were caught wrong-footed.  
 
The story for trend is different: Trend was a crowded strategy at the beginning of our 
sample period, but this crowdedness led simply to flat performance for the trend strategy 
during this period. After managers gave up on the trend strategy, trend delivered strong a 
performance, leading to opportunity costs, but no actual losses. These differences among 
strategies might also be related to the fact that returns to carry and value trading exhibit 
negative skewness, while trend exhibits positive skewness.
21 Crowdedness in carry and 
                                                           
20 We tried relating crowdedness in a strategy to expected returns in that strategy which for carry were 
modelled as the interest differential plus the expected exchange rate change. Expected returns for PPP and 
Trend Following were simply the expected exchange rate change, which for PPP were based on some rate 
of convergence to parity. We found only weak evidence that crowdedness responded to expected returns 
modelled in this way. 
21 See PL (2008a) for descriptive statistics of the currency risk factors.     22
value leaves investors in those strategies vulnerable to sudden stops in capital flows that 
support the carry trade, or to shifts in fundamentals that shift sentiment toward 
undervalued currencies. Thus, crowdedness in carry and value might signal future sharp 
moves.
22 By comparison, a crowded trend style simply implies low future returns. This 
is as expected, as trend-followers are unlikely to experience a sudden drawdown as price 
changes will trigger a change in positioning. For example, trend-followers who are long 
the EURUSD cross, will exit this position (and even go short) when the EUR declines 
against the USD below a certain level. In contrast, carry and value strategies would not 
lead to changes in positioning when the price moves against the positions.  
 
Our results suggest a possible relationship between the performance of a trading strategy 
(or style) and our measure of crowdedness. While our sample period is too short for 
more formal statistical tests, our analysis suggests that there may be an adverse 
relationship between crowdedness and style performance, in particular in the carry and 
value styles. This will hopefully stimulate some future research on this subject.  
 
                                                           
22 See Brunnermeier, Nagel and Pedersen (2008) for an analysis linking carry trading with crash risk.    23
4. Conclusions 
The financial crisis of 2008 highlights the importance of detecting crowded trades due to 
the risks they pose to the stability of the financial system and to the global economy. 
However, there is a perception that crowded trades are difficult to identify.
23 To date, no 
single measure to capture the crowdedness of a trade or a trading style has developed.  
 
Using a unique data base of professional foreign exchange manager returns, we propose 
and estimate a new measure for style crowdedness. Our measure of crowdedness 
suggests that carry became a crowded strategy in the first quarter of 2008 at the end of 
our sample period. The liquidation of the carry trade in the second half of 2008 implies 
some adverse relationship between crowdedness and the future performance of the carry 
trade strategy. Value exhibits an analogous pattern with managers crowding the 
contrarian value trade. The percentage of value-contrarian managers peaked towards the 
end of our sample period, and the value strategy exhibited especially strong performance 
a few months later. In the case of trend, managers suffered mostly opportunity losses. 
Managers appeared to “give up” on trend in early 2008 only to experience a revival of 
the performance of trend-following strategies.  
 
                                                           
23 For example, in attempting to measure the extent of carry trade activity, Galati, Heath and McGuire 
(2007) analyze various banking and capital flow data. The authors do not offer numerical estimates. They 
conclude that “growth in carry trades funded in yen and Swiss francs has probably contributed to increased 
activity in these currencies” but that “the available data do not allow for a more refined measurement of 
the size of carry trade positions.” And on the same theme, in their analysis of carry trading and currency 
movements in 2008, McCauley and McGuire (2009) conclude that “Carry trades always defy 
measurement.” It is worth stressing that our approach does not provide a quantitative estimate of the 
volume of carry trades outstanding.   24
Our results suggest that our measure of crowdedness deserves closer monitoring. In our 
short sample period, the anecdotal evidence shows that crowdedness may provide useful 
signals regarding the future performance of a given strategy. As more and more funds 
attempt to exploit market timing strategies by switching among trading styles in order to 
deliver alpha and not simply beta, crowdedness may again become a significant element 
of market dynamics. Indeed as US dollar interest rates remained close to zero during 
2009, commentators allege that a surging US dollar based carry trade has developed that 
will have dire consequences once it begins to unwind.
24 Additional data will allow 
researchers to track when our measure of crowdedness reveals any unwinding and 
whether changes in crowdedness correlate with exchange rate movements
25.  
 
Hearings held by the U.S. House Financial Services Committee in 2009 considered 
proposals for a “systematic risk regulator” who could take into account, among other 
things, that crowded trades elevate the risk to the financial system because crowding is 
itself a source of instability. But as some observers have noted, “the sad truth [is] that 
crowded trades are difficult for the government to identify.”
26 Our methodology may 
offer useful insights regarding the popularity of certain trades – in currencies, gold, or 
other assets – among hedge funds. Although, we apply our approach to currencies, it 
could be easily extended to other asset classes. Further research in this area could be 
relevant for both investors and managers. For example, it would be interesting to 
                                                           
24 Nouriel Roubini, "Mother of all carry trades faces an inevitable bust," Financial Times, November 1 
2009. 
25 Currency managers’ returns are usually available on a daily basis to plan sponsors. Thus, some 
institutional investors could update and follow our measure of crowdedness on a daily basis.   
26 Sebastian Mallaby, "A Risky 'Systemic' Watchdog," Washington Post, March 2, 2009.   25
investigate if the hedge fund community become too long “equity risk” ahead of the 
collapse in equity indices in the second half of 2008.  
    26
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Panel A: Between July 2008 and December 2008 
Weekly Data, 07/04/2008 – 12/26/2008, 26 weekly observations 
 
  S&P 500  Crude Oil  AUD/JPY 
S&P 500  1 0.558  0.841 
Crude Oil  0.558 1 0.555 
AUD/JPY  0.841 0.555  1 
 
 
Panel B: Between January 1990 and December 2008 
Weekly Data, 01/12/1990 – 12/26/2008, 990 weekly observations 
 
  S&P 500  Crude Oil  AUD/JPY 
S&P 500  1 0.019  0.323 
Crude Oil  0.019 1 0.132 




Data source:  Bloomberg and authors’ calculations. 
 
Note: Correlations computed using log differences in the spot prices.    29
 
Exhibit 2: Rolling Yearly Correlation of Returns on Two Cross Rates  
 
Weekly Data, 01/04/1991 – 03/27/2009 
 










04/01/91 04/01/94 04/01/97 04/01/00 04/01/03 04/01/06 04/01/09
 
 
Data source:  Bloomberg and authors’ calculations. 
 
Note: Correlation is computed by using a rolling sample of 52 weekly observations. The 
first correlation measure is for January 4, 1991. Currency returns are computed from 
January 12, 1990 until March 27, 2009.  
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28/09/2005 28/03/2006 28/09/2006 28/03/2007 28/09/2007
 
 
Source: Deutsche Bank and authors’ calculations 
 
Number of funds on the platform in week t, which have been active since week t-25, 
where t = 9/28/2005 – 3/26-2009 or 131 weeks. Funds with a track record of less than 26 
weeks (1/2 year) are not used for estimating of crowdedness.  
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Exhibit 4: Estimated t-values for alpha and beta coefficients for manager #6 
 
Rolling regression results for  ∑ + + =
i t t i i t F R ε β α , , where R are the returns of manager 
#6; i = Carry, Trend, Value and Volatility; t = 1, …26 weekly observations.  
 
The first regression is estimated with 26 weekly observations from 4/06/2005 until 
9/28/2005. The last regression is estimated with 26 weekly observations from 














28/09/05 27/03/06 23/09/06 22/03/07 18/09/07 16/03/08
Alpha Carry Trend Value Volatility  32
 
Exhibit 5: Carry Crowdedness 
 
Rolling regression results for  ∑ + + =
i t j t i j i j t j F R , , , , ε β α for manager j active on the 
platform at least from week t-25 onwards. The number of managers varies according to 
Exhibit 3.  
 
Carry crowdedness is defined as in Equation #2. The first measure for crowdedness is 
estimated as of 9/28/2005 with 26 weekly observations from 4/06/2005 until 9/28/2005. 
The last measure of crowdedness is estimated as of 3/26/2008 with 26 weekly 






Crowdedness measures are on left-hand scale and Performance measure is on the right-
hand scale. 
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Exhibit 6: Trend Crowdedness 
 
Rolling regression results for  ∑ + + =
i t j t i j i j t j F R , , , , ε β α for manager j active on the 
platform at least from week t-25 onwards. The number of managers varies according to 
Exhibit 3.  
 
Trend crowdedness is defined as in Equation #2. The first measure for crowdedness is 
estimated as of 9/28/2005 with 26 weekly observations from 4/06/2005 until 9/28/2005. 
The last measure of crowdedness is estimated as of 3/26/2008 with 26 weekly 







Crowdedness measures are on left-hand scale and Performance measure is on the right-
hand scale. 
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Exhibit 7: Value Crowdedness 
 
Rolling regression results for  ∑ + + =
i t j t i j i j t j F R , , , , ε β α for manager j active on the 
platform at least from week t-25 onwards. The number of managers varies according to 
Exhibit 3.  
 
Value crowdedness is defined as in Equation #2. The first measure for crowdedness is 
estimated as of 9/28/2005 with 26 weekly observations from 4/06/2005 until 9/28/2005. 
The last measure of crowdedness is estimated as of 3/26/2008 with 26 weekly 







Crowdedness measures are on left-hand scale and Performance measure is on the right-
hand scale. 
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Exhibit 8:  Characteristics of Funds at High and Low Points of Crowdedness by 
Style of Strategy 
 
Panel A: Carry 
 
# funds on the 
platform 
# funds with 
significant carry 
exposure 





# funds with 
no significant 
carry exposure
Dec 28, 2005  41  2  5  34 
Same / dropped-
out / converted 
15 / 13 / 13  1 / 0 / 1  2 / 2 / 1  12 / 11/ 11 
March 26, 2008  54  22  5  27 
new / old / 
converted 
26 / 28/ 0  11 / 1 / 10  2 / 2/ 1/  13 / 12 / 2 
 
Panel B: Trend 
 
# funds on the 
platform 
# funds with 
significant 
trend exposure 





# funds with no 
significant 
trend exposure 




24 / 18 / 17  2 / 5 / 14  0 / 0 / 1  22 / 13 / 2 
March 26, 2008  54  4  2  48 
new / old / 
converted 
13 / 41 / 0  1 / 2 / 1  1 / 0 / 1  11 / 22 /15 
 
Panel C: Value 
 
# funds on the 
platform 
# funds with 
significant 
value exposure 





# funds with no 
significant 
value exposure 




15 / 12 / 14  0 / 2 / 4  0 / 1 / 0  15 / 9 / 10 
March 12, 2008  56  3  18  35 
new / old / 
converted 
27 / 29 / 0  1 / 0 / 2  8 / 0 / 10  18 / 15 / 2 
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Exhibit 9:   Correlations of Crowdedness Measures with Lagged Performance of 
Trading Strategies 
 











Performance (26 weeks) 














Lagged 26 weeks 
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5% 
 
Panel C: Sept 28, 2005 – December 27, 2006 (66 weekly observations) 










Performance (26 weeks) 














Lagged 26 weeks 
 
   
-36% 